The recent report regarding this spring’s shootings at Virginia Tech has generated a new round of demands for “accountability” from the university and police officials who responded to events that day. However, given credible information and rational assumptions based on evidence, there was little those officials could have known to do differently. Last week’s shootings at Delaware State University, the first such major event since the Virginia Tech incident, incorporated the lessons learned from the earlier tragedy.

Most criticism of the Virginia Tech leaders’ response focuses on the timeline of events. Seung Hui Cho shot two students in a residence hall, then left the campus before returning two hours later to shoot 31 more. Between the two events, critics say officials did not issue sufficient warning of the danger that still confronted students.

However, given the nature of the first event, there was little reason to suspect the second event before it happened. The first shooting appeared to be a personal confrontation and the shooter had left the area. Analyzing the scene using knowledge of similar incidents, there was no indication that the response was lacking.

The shooting at Delaware State had many similarities to the first half of the Virginia Tech incident. A seemingly personal crime targeted two people, then the shooter fled. However, administrators at Delaware State drew on their knowledge of what occurred at Virginia Tech and responded differently. Student notification began within 15 minutes and the entire campus was locked down. KU also has contingency plans in the event of a disaster, including mitigation, preparedness programs, notification of students and staff and facilitating third-party response units (such as police and paramedics). As a direct result of the Virginia Tech tragedy, students and staff can now receive emergency notifications on their cell phones.

Students, faculty and family members who question the Virginia Tech response are demanding more from officials than can be reasonably expected. No one can predict the future; all that can be done is to respond against likely scenarios, and until the Virginia Tech shooting, the gunman’s behavior was not a likely scenario. Prediction requires logic, and logic requires rationality. Few decision-makers are less rational than rogue gunmen. The recent report concedes that Cho’s motives are still unknown. Without knowing motives, preemption becomes nearly impossible. This tragedy allowed Delaware State to better respond to subsequent events, but no event can be used as a case history to help guide the response to itself, and blaming anyone other than the shooter for the extent of the Virginia Tech tragedy is not a fair solution. The best that officials can do is plan a response that keeps casualties to a bare minimum. Both Delaware State in practice and KU in theory have successfully done this.

Life is inherently risky, and we all play the percentages every day. Guarding against reasonable threats is prudent; guarding against every contingent is impossible. When government is perceived to “over-respond,” as with some flight restrictions, the public complains of inconvenience. When an official response is seen as too lax, accountability is demanded. Instead of comparing the response to the following events, it should be compared to the knowledge possessed at the time. When judged thus, both the Virginia Tech and the Delaware State responses, though quite different, were each prudent and adequate.